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Abstract
The increased popularity of mobile devices, such as laptops, mobile phones, tablets,
accessory devices, and more, brings new challenges in the area of network security. In ubiq-
uitous environment, where ad-hoc networks may be formed using mobile devices, virtual
connection or pairing is required before transferring any data wirelessly. Large numbers of
researches have focused on the user-aided authentication to establish a secure connection
between mobile devices, commonly referred as secure device pairing. The user-aided au-
thentication is an authentication technique that is generally based on a human perceivable
channel, called out-of-band (OOB) channel, through which the authentication data can be
transferred.
A significant number of OOB channels have been proposed so far. The principle limi-
tation of these approaches, however, is that every one of them is devoted to one particular
situation and is not intended to be used for various mobile devices. In general, a univer-
sally applicable OOB channel is unlikely to exist in the near future due to the different
capabilities of a wide variety of mobile devices as well as human users who have diverse
preferences. Therefore, if a mobile device possesses as many as possible OOB channels, its
possibility of successful pairing in ad-hoc and ubiquitous environment will increase. Based
on this concept, we have defined our research vision, “the more OOB channels, the more
security”. To support the vision, we have proposed two new methods.
First, we have introduced a new OOB channel that uses an accelerometer-based gesture
input. Gesture-based OOB channel is suitable for all-kinds of mobile devices, including
input/output constrained devices, as the accelerometer is small and incurs only a small
computational overhead. In our OOB channel, one device converts the authentication data
into a sequence of gestures and informs a user of them. The user then performs the gestures
one-by-one with the second device that has an embedded accelerometer to transfer the data
into it. We have implemented a prototype system and conducted thorough usability analysis
to compare our gesture-based OOB channel with the existing OOB channels. Result showed
that the gesture-based OOB channel has reliable performance with a mean completion time
of 16.86 seconds with SD=4.2 seconds, as well as a mean error rate of 0.13 per transfer with
SD = 0.34. Four different gesture sets were used in this experiment to determine which
library size would be more usable in practice. The result suggested that library size of 8
gestures was the most effective among our tested sizes. We have also conducted another
iii
experiment to determine whether user-defined gesture templates improve the accuracy of
gesture recognition. Contrary to expectations, this study did not find a significant difference
between the predefined and user-defined templates in terms of the error rate.
Second, we have designed a new secure group association method that utilizes various
types of OOB channels. The term secure group association is generally understood to mean
that every device pairs with other group members. There has been little discussion of set-
ting up secure connections among a group of mobile devices. Some security protocols have
been proposed, but they have tended to focus on a scenario whereby all devices must be
physically located in the same place to perform the association. In contrast, our method is
designed for a broader range of scenario and does not require all devices to be in one place
at one time. It occurs in an accumulative manner, allowing each device to join the group
independently from the other group members and their associations. To join a group, a
device must perform secure pairing with one of the group members. Digital certificates are
then issued upon the successful authentication. Once certificates are exchanged between
the new device and the member, pairing with other group members becomes automatic
owing to the certification path. We have implemented a prototype system and conducted
a comparative user experiment in order to ensure viability of the proposed method. The
result proved that the accumulative group association spends the same amount time as the
simultaneous group association. In addition, we have reported comparison on accumulative
and simultaneous associations and it clearly demonstrates our proposed method has a num-
ber of attractive features, such as stronger scalability, greater flexibility, unlimited group
size, better device diversity and etc, over the existing protocols.
In summary, there will be more portable devices and more collaborative work in the
near future, and the user-aided authentication will still play an important role to secure
ad-hoc and ubiquitous networks. We hope that our proposed methods contribute to build
the secure environment, where the security is always available on demand.
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Introduction
Over the last few decades there has been tremendous growth in the area of ubiquitous
computing, and numerous portable devices that perform many complex operations and can
be used in a wide variety of applications have been developed. Technologies including Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, and ZigBee have been created to enable wireless communication between these
devices. However, compared to wired connections, wireless networks are more vulnerable to
security threats, in particular eavesdropping and alteration, also termed man-in-the-middle
(MitM) attack [1]. It is generally assumed that major security issues, including MitM,
can be addressed if ones cryptographic public key can be authenticated. Authentication
methods, such as using a pre-installed key or a trusted third party authentication, cannot
be adopted, because wireless networks are usually set up on an ad-hoc basis involving
unfamiliar devices. Therefore, a new authentication mechanism is needed for ad-hoc and
ubiquitous networks. Large numbers of researches have been focused on the user-aided
authentication to bootstraps the problem.
Throughout this dissertation, the term secure device pairing is used in its broadest sense
to refer to establishment of a secure connection between two mobile devices. Similarly, the
term secure group association is used to mean establishment of secure connections among
a group of mobile devices. Both secure device pairing and secure group association have
been employing the user-aided authentication to enable security.
There are many everyday scenarios where two or more mobile devices need to interact
in a secure manner. The common secure pairing case occurs when two devices, such as a
Bluetooth headset and a cell phone, or a PDA and a wireless printer, transfer sensitive data
to and from each other. Likewise, a wireless body area network (BAN) with portable sensor
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devices enables continuous monitoring of patients in the hospital. BAN is an emerging group
collaborative case in recent years, and also deals with important medical information of a
patient that needs more requirements for security [2].
1.1 User-Aided Authentication
The main principle of the user-aided authentication is to use human user’s involvement
in the authentication process. In this paradigm, an additional auxiliary channel that is
perceivable by the user, called the out-of-band (OOB) channel, exists between two mo-
bile devices, as well as the ordinary wireless channel, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. In this
dissertation, the requester refers to the device that is about to be authenticated and the ver-
ifier refers to the device that does the authenticating. Various pairing protocols have been
proposed so far, and Figure 1.1 depicts a simple one to elucidate how the user-aided authen-
tication works. To authenticate the requester, the verifier receives both the cryptographic
public key through the wireless channel and the hash of the same key via the OOB channel.
The user involvement is required in OOB channel transmission and the data, transferred
through OOB channel, is called the authentication data. The verifier then generates another
hash for the requesters public key and checks it against the received hash data. If cross
authentication is required, the same process is repeated in the reverse direction.
Figure 1.1: Simple user-aided authentication
One important question that needs to be answered before going any further, however,
is whether the user-aided authentication can be trusted. Authentication in Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is based on the concept that all entities have confidence in centralized
Certificate Authorities and their issued digital certificates [3]. Similarly, the user-aided
authentication assumes that a human user who is trying to pair mobile devices is trustworthy
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and his or her action is expected to be sincere and honest. This assumption is quite normal
because the user is the one who gets the benefits from the paired devices.
As it can be seen from Figure 1.1, the user-aided authentication consists of two indepen-
dent yet inseparable parts: an authentication protocol and an OOB channel. The following
subsections will give a brief overview of each one of them.
1.1.1 Authentication Protocols
The concept of the user-aided authentication was the first introduced in 1999, and at
the same time the first protocol to form a secure wireless network was presented [1]. The
new approach was then studied and refined further by many researchers, and as a result,
various secure device pairing and secure group association protocols have been proposed[4–
13]. Some of these protocols require a specific OOB channel whereas others are designed
to operate on various mobile devices. Vaudenay et al. [14] have introduced a SAS (Short
Authenticated String) protocol, which is well suited for many low-bandwidth OOB channels.
It reduces the length of the authentication data to 15 bits while providing a reasonable level
of security. Thus, the protocol has become favorable for many mobile devices that are not
able to transfer large data because of their limited physical capabilities. It has also played
an important role in our research.
SAS protocol is depicted in Figure 1.2. It is based on a cryptography function, called
Commitment Scheme. It has several important features that make the scheme useful for
a number of network applications [15]. Commitment Scheme consists of two functions:
commit that is used to commit a value to keep it hidden to others and open that is used to
reveal the committed value. In SAS protocol, both the requester and the verifier first choose
random 15 bit data (RanR and RanV ) independently. The requester device then commits
on the chosen data together with its public key (PKR). After reception of the requester’s
public key and the commit value c, the verifier device gives its own random data to the
requester. Following this, the requester opens its commitment by sending value d, and
consequently, the verifier can obtain the requester’s random value without transferring it
through insecure wireless channel. Finally, the requester computes SAS data (RanR⊕RanV )
and sends it through an OOB channel. The verifier then checks the received SAS data with
its own computed one. If the requester’s public key as well as other transferred values
are tampered in transmission, the SAS authentication data on both side do not match.
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Figure 1.2: SAS (Short Authenticated String) protocol
Therefore, upon the successful completion, the verifier device can ensure that the received
public key belongs to the requester device.
1.1.2 Out-of-band Channels and Their Classification
A significant number of OOB channels have been investigated in research. These OOB
channels vary according to the type of physical interfaces they need. For example, they
require mobile devices to possess different hardwires, such as a display [16–22], a camera
[19, 23–25], a LED light([23–26]), a speaker [26–30], a microphone [18, 26–28, 30], a keyboard
[22], a button [28], a radio transceiver [31], a vibration [28], a ultrasound transceiver [32], a
biometric sensor [33] and even a laser transceiver [34] to transmit the authentication data
between them. This may explain why no single OOB channel has become a standard.
Many different classifications depending on various aspects of the user-aided authenti-
cation have been defined in recent studies [35–37]. However, in this dissertation, we empha-
size the one that is based on the human user involvement. OOB channels may be divided
into three main categories: device-to-device (d2d), device-to-human plus human-to-device
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(d2h+h2d), and two device-to-human (2xd2h). In d2d OOB channels, the authentication
data is transferred between two devices with the help of the user while in d2h+h2d OOB
channels, the user receives the authentication data from one device and sends it further to
another device. In both d2d and d2h+h2d, the device decides the outcome of the pairing.
In 2xd2h OOB channels, the user himself compares the authentication data on both devices
and decides the pairing outcome.
To elucidate how the authentication data is transferred via each type of OOB channel, we
will look at three of them briefly. McCune et al.[19] proposed a barcode-based OOB channel
(d2d). In this system, the requester encodes the authentication data into a two-dimensional
barcode and shows it on its screen. The verifier reads the barcode using a camera. Goodrich
et al.[18] developed a speaker display-based OOB channel (2xd2h). Authentication data are
converted into text; one device speaks to it and the other shows the text on its screen. The
user compares the texts to complete the authentication. Soriente et al.[28] introduced a
button-based OOB channel (d2h+h2d). When the requester transmits the authentication
data in the form of either beeps or blinks from an LED light, the user presses the button
synchronously on the verifier side.
1.2 Motivation and Research Vision
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of the user-aided authentication is that there
are a large number of OOB channels available, however, none of them is generally accepted
as a standard. And, none is likely be in the near future because they currently cannot be
adapted to the wide range of mobile devices that exist. A barcode-based OOB channel,
for instance, requires a display for the requester and a camera for the verifier, which is not
suitable for many input/output constrained devices. There is high likelihood of arising a
problem, unknown OOB channel, when two devices pair spontaneously in the ad-hoc and
ubiquitous networks.
Consequently, the problem leads to the conclusion that the adoption of OOB channels
is not exclusively limited to using one OOB channel. A mobile device can simultaneously
employ multiple OOB channels. Given this, our research vision, “the more OOB chan-
nels, the more security,” is formulated as follows. Instead of trying to adjust one OOB
channel to all mobile devices, which is hard to achieve, study possibilities that a mobile
device uses as many as possible OOB channels.
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Interesting studies that support our research vision have recently been reported by
Chong et al. [38] and Ion et al. [39]. The major findings of these researches reveal that
there is no dominant device pairing method in the real life. Instead, people prefer different
methods, and tend to select different OOB channels depending on the situation.
In order to support our research vision, we have proposed two new methods. First, we
have introduced a completely new OOB channel that transfers the authentication data using
an accelerometer-based gesture input. Second, we have designed a novel secure group asso-
ciation method, in which mobile devices can employ their desired OOB channels. Whereas,
the existing secure group association protocols require all group members to use the same
OOB channels.
1.3 Dissertation organization
The presented dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces our new OOB
channel and reports conducted user experiments. Chapter 3 explains our proposed secure
group association method and compares it with the existing protocols. Finally, chapter 4
concludes the dissertation and presents future work.
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Chapter 2
Gesture-based Out-of-band
Channel
2.1 Motivation
To support our research vision, “the more OOB channels, the more security”, we have
introduced a new OOB channel that utilizes an accelerometer-based gesture input. We
imply that the possibility of secure pairing will increase to some extent, if a mobile device
possesses multiple OOB channels. For instance, assume that a wireless headset is able to
pair using button-based OOB channel [28]. This channel requires the requester to have a
LED light that may not be available for some devices. If the headset is also capable of
pairing with a gesture-based OOB channel, it can pair with mobile devices that have either
the LED light or a display.
There are a number of important reasons why we have chosen to consider the gesture-
based OOB channel.
First of all, the gesture-based OOB channel is well suited for all mobile devices, in-
cluding input/output constraint devices, because modern accelerometers are very small and
lightweight. The accelerometer inside an iPhone 4S handset, for example, is 3mm×3mm×
1mm thick and weighs 30 mg. In fact, accelerometers are already embedded in some com-
mercial products, such as smart phones and Nintendo Wiimote.
Second, gestures represent one of the most promising interactive interfaces in the ubiq-
uitous environment [40]; they are natural and intuitive for humans, and so gesture-based
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operations are easy to implement and require little effort. Furthermore, most of the work
on gesture recognition has been based on computer vision techniques [41]. However, gesture
recognition from the tri-axis accelerometer data is an emerging technique for gesture based
interactions. It requires a relatively small computational overhead compared to vision-based
approaches.
Finally, there is an important and practical problem that related to the human user
behavior, called rushing user [36]. A rushing user is a user who, in rush to connect her
two devices, tends to skip through the pairing process, if possible. It has been shown that
computer users are likely to be task focused [42]. For example, when a user logs on to
the website of her bank, her focus is to pay a bill; she would tend to ignore any warning
indicating a phishing attempt. Similarly, in the context of secure device pairing, when a user
wants to connect her Bluetooth cell phone with a handset, she is eager to speak to someone.
Such a rushing user behavior is quite common in practice. The findings of Kumar et al.
[36] have revealed that d2h+h2d type of OOB channels are the most resistant to rushing
user behavior whereas 2xd2h type of OOB channels ate the most vulnerable against it. In
d2h+h2d channels, the user is somewhat forced to perform the pairing process correctly,
because otherwise he or she will not be able to connect the devices. Therefore, from the
security point of view, d2h+h2d type of OOB channels, including our gesture-based channel,
are preferable.
2.2 Related work
2.2.1 Out-of-band channels
A number of surveys of secure device pairing methods have been presented [35–37, 43].
They surveyed various aspects of secure device pairing techniques, such as the required
hardwires, the user actions in the pairing process, protocol mechanisms, and factors that
could influence usability of the pairing.
The success of user-aided authentication is dependent on the performance and effec-
tiveness of the OOB channel, which basically depends on the user performing certain tasks
correctly. Thus, comparative studies of existing OOB channels in terms of usability were
independently conducted by Kumar et al. [36], Kainda et al. [44], and Kobsa et al. [45].
Findings in these studies revealed that in general, OOB channels offer varying degrees
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of usability. Moreover, studies suggested that, among their tested techniques, traditional
methods such as comparing or typing short strings into mobile devices yields lower error,
and are the most robust, the fastest and the user’s most preferred methods despite the fact
that they require rich user interfaces.
Bluetooth connection is currently the most well-known representative of the secure de-
vice pairing in real life. Its authentication uses three different OOB channels [46] depending
on the hardware capabilities of mobile devices: 1) If both devices have displays and are capa-
ble of entering yes or no, such as a laptop and a cell phone, pairing uses numeric comparison
as shown in Figure 2.1 (a). In numeric comparison based OOB channel, a user compares
the numbers in both devices. If they agree, the user enters acceptance in both devices, or
otherwise the user enters rejection and the system cancels the pairing procedure. 2) If one
device has an input capability but does not have a display and the other device has an
output capability, such as a laptop and a keyboard, pairing uses passkey entry, as shown in
Figure 2.1 (b). In passkey entry OOB channel, a user first reads a passkey displayed on a
device and then enters the same key into other device. 3) In other cases, like at least one
device does not have a display nor an input capability, such as a cell phone and a headset,
pairing just connects the devices without using any OOB channel.
Figure 2.1: Bluetooth Pairing: (a) Numeric comparison, (b) Passkey entry
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Another secure device pairing approach is to generate the same shared key in both
devices without transferring any data through secure or insecure channels. Up to recently,
few reports in this area exist. Mayrhover et al. [47] proposed a system whereby two mobile
devices are held and shaken together to create a shared secret key. In this case, both
devices must have embedded accelerometers, and the acceleration data are converted into
the same key. Lin et al. [48] demonstrated that tapping the same rhythm on both pairing
devices can create a shared secret key. Any tappable input device, from a simple button to
various sensors, can utilize the method. However, these methods may be vulnerable to a
shoulder-surfing attack.
In general, establishing a connection between two mobile devices is termed device pair-
ing. As devices have become wireless, the communication medium no longer dictates which
devices will connect. Instead connections are established based on user actions that can
take many different forms. A widely deployed mechanism is Bluetooth pairing, which in-
volves selection of a target device from a list of available devices. However, researchers
have demonstrated an alternative approach that also uses many different types out-of-band
channels: laser-based [49], button-based [50], movement-based [51], touch-based [52] audio-
based [53], light-based [54] and so on. However, a primary purpose of these OOB channels
is to select a specific device in the environment, and they do not consider how to protect
the established connection.
Studer et al. [55] developed a secure pairing protocol, Shot, that also used an accelerom-
eter to authenticate two smart phones. In order to transfer the authentication data, two
phones must be hold together, and one phone vibrates the data while another phone obtains
it using an accelerometer. However, the protocol is originally designed for Bump exchange,
which is no longer available, and so it relies on a centralized server.
2.2.2 Accelerometer-based Gesture Input
Gesture-based interaction is one of the active and attractive fields of HCI. Significant
number of research have been investigating various aspects of the area of gesture interaction,
including how to recognize gestures, how to perform gestures, how to select gestures and
so on. In the context of this research, we have considered more on the OOB channel than
gesture related issues. In other words, we have tried to evaluate whether a gesture input
can be used as OOB channel or not.
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However, our research is closely related to gesture input involving mobile devices with
accelerometers. Because many mobile devices are too small to be equipped with conven-
tional input peripherals, such as a keyboard, gestures hold promise as an alternative input
method for such devices. Jones et al. [56] developed a tilt gesture-based text entry system
for mobile devices, and achieved a mean error rate of 0.09 errors per character. Choi et al.
[57] were able to recognize nine digits and five symbols that are written in the air as an
input to a phone handset. Similar work was also carried out by Agrawal et al. [58]. When
drawn in the air with the smart phone, an image is generated from the acceleration data.
Gesture inputs have also been used for security purposes. Patel et al. [59] developed
a system in which a shake gesture enables to access public terminals. Chong et al. [60]
proposed a system that uses accelerometer-based gestures to input a password to access the
mobile device. However, the aim of our research is to transfer the authentication data from
one mobile device to another using gestures.
2.3 Proposed Gesture-based OOB Channel
We have proposed a new OOB channel that uses an accelerometer-based gesture input.
To transfer the authentication data between two mobile devices, a user performs a sequence
of gestures, which are informed by the requester, holding the verifier that has an embedded
tri-axis accelerometer. Because the gesture-based OOB channel has a low-bandwidth, SAS
protocol [14], explained in section 1.1, is the most suitable. However, we suggest a modified
SAS protocol [23] instead as it can improve the effectiveness of the original protocol by
changing a unidirectional authentication scheme into bidirectional. In other words, with
the modified SAS protocol, both devices are able to be authenticated with a single OOB
channel transfer.
The modified SAS protocol is depicted in Figure 2.2. As can be easily seen, it is
very similar to the original SAS protocol. The main difference is that a public key of the
verifier (PKV ) also takes part in the calculation of the SAS authentication data (SAS =
PKV ⊕H(PKV , PKR)), where H() is any cryptographic hash function. In addition, once
the verifier decides an outcome (b) of the authentication by comparing the received SAS
data with its own computed one, it has to inform the requester of the result in order to
finalize the bidirectional authentication. To do that, the protocol suggests another d2h+h2d
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Figure 2.2: Modified SAS protocol
channel, so that the result can securely reach the requester. However, the result is either
yes or no; therefore, it should not be a problem.
From the user’s perspective, the authentication process of the modified SAS protocol
follows six steps, as shown in Figure 2.3. Steps 1, 5, and 6 are the same in all OOB channels
whereas steps 2, 3 and 4 vary depending on the channel. Each step is described in detail,
as follows.
STEP 1. Public keys and other necessary data for the SAS protocol are exchanged via
a regular wireless channel between two devices.
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Figure 2.3: Authentication process in the gesture-based OOB channel
STEP 2. The requester device computes the SAS data, converts them into gestures, and
informs the user of the gestures. Any means can be used so long as it tells
the user which gestures he or she must perform. For example, if the requester
device has a graphical display, it can show the gestures on the screen. If the
requester can report only numbers, an identification number (ID) can be used
for the gestures. In this case, a hardcopy or web-based manual is needed for
the user to look up the corresponding gesture images.
STEP 3. The user performs the gestures with the verifier device that has an embedded
tri-axis accelerometer.
STEP 4. The verifier device recognizes the gestures, converts them back into the data,
and compares the data with own created SAS data.
STEP 5. The verifier device informs the user of the result of this comparison. The result
is either YES or NO, where any simple output, such as the blink of an LED
light or a beep, is sufficient.
STEP 6. The user informs the requester device of the result. It also can be done with a
simple action, such as pressing a button.
2.4 Prototype System
To assess the usability of gesture-based OOB channel, we have developed a prototype
system and conducted two user experiments. In the prototype, we used a desktop PC as
the requester and an iPhone 4S handset (with a dual-core 1 GHz Cortex-A9 CPU with 515
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MB of RAM and an STMicro 3-axis accelerometer with a 100 Hz output data rate) as the
verifier.
Figure 2.4: Prototype setup of the user experiment
The main task of the prototype system is to transfer 15 bit data from the PC to the
phone handset using a gesture input. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the transmission occurs in
the prototype system. First, the PC generates a random 15 bit number, converts it into
a sequence of gestures, and displays both the number and the gesture set. Following this,
a user carries out the gestures, one by one, holding the handset. Once the gestures are
performed, the phone handset converts them into a number, and displays the number on
its screen. If the original number on the PC screen and the number on the handset match,
the transmission is successfully completed.
2.4.1 Gesture Library
Because the user has to perform a sequence of multiple gestures for one input, we chose
gestures that end in the same place they start. Also, we tried to avoid too complicated
gestures for the sake of easiness. Table 2.1 presents selected gestures, their names and
corresponding IDs in the system. The start of each gesture is marked with a black dot and
the end is marked with an arrow.
2.4.2 Gesture Encoding
To obtain a relationship between the size of the gesture library and the performance of
the channel, four different interfaces are proposed: Digit10, Bit8, Depth6, and Bit4. The
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Table 2.1: List of selected gestures
ID Gesture Name ID Gesture Name
0 Right&Back 5 Left Circle
1 Down&Back 6 Right Square
2 Left&Back 7 Left Square
3 Up&Back 8 Right Triangle
4 Right Circle 9 Left Triangle
gesture library of the Bit4 interface consists of the first four gestures in Table 2.1, while
Depth6, Bit8, and Digit10 consist of six, eight, and ten gestures, respectively. Table 2.2
summarizes four interfaces.
Table 2.2: Summary of proposed interfaces
Interface Gesture Library Gestures per Input
Bit4 0, 1, 2, 3 8
Depth6 Bit4 + 4, 5 6-10
Bit8 Depth6 + 6, 7 5
Digit10 Bit8 + 8, 9 5
To convert 15 bit data into a sequence of gestures, each interface utilizes a different
encoding method based on their library sizes. These conversions were implemented using
.NET framework and run on the desktop PC.
Table 2.3 provides an example of how each interface converts decimal number (13595)
into gestures. Conversion methods are explained as follows.
Digit10: It changes each digit, or ID in our case, with a corresponding gesture directly.
Bit8: The number is converted into an octal number and each octal digit is changed
with a corresponding gesture.
Depth6: The number is also converted into an octal number. Eight octal digits are
divided into two levels, as shown in Figure 2.5, where four gestures represent
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Table 2.3: Gesture conversion sample of interfaces
Interface Gesture Conversion (1359510)
Bit4 031101234
Depth6 324338
Bit8 324338
Digit10 1359510
digits in each level and the remaining two gestures are used to move between
levels.
Figure 2.5: Depth6 conversion method
Bit4: It applies the same encoding as Bit8, except the number is converted into a
quaternary number.
To obtain the data back from gestures, the very same methods, but in reverse order,
are applied in each interface. These conversions were implemented in Objective C language
and run on the iPhone handset.
2.4.3 Gesture Recognition
The first step of accelerometer-based gesture recognition is to get the acceleration data of
a gesture motion, and then the gesture is recognized from the captured data. Researchers
have applied diverse techniques, including the hidden Markov method (HMM) [61–63] ,
Bayesian networks [64], FDSVM [65], and dynamic time wrapping (DTW) [66–68] to the
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accelerometer-based gesture recognition. We used the DTW method in our prototype be-
cause of its comparatively high accuracy, fast computational performance, and the need for
relatively few templates [65, 69].
DTW is an algorithm that measures the similarity between two sequences of different
lengths [70]. It has long been known in speech recognition community [71], however, the
technique has flourished, and has been applied to a variety of problems, including gesture
recognition. Because DTW is a template-based method, gesture recognition selects the best-
matched template as a candidate. To determine the candidate template for a gesture from
a predefined template library, the similarity costs between the gesture and each template
are computed first. Following this, the template that has the lowest similarity cost is chosen
as the candidate.
In our prototype, the acceleration data is captured in 10ms (or 100Hz) intervals. Prior
to computing the similarity cost, a couple of optimization methods are applied to the raw
data. First, the acceleration data is filtered using a high-pass filter to isolate sudden changes
in movement from the constant effects of gravity. We then quantize the filtered data by an
averaging window of 50 mps that moves at a 30 mps step. Quantization reduces the length
of the data as well as improves recognition accuracy by removing acceleration noise and
minor hand tilt. In addition to the optimization methods, we use an exact half of the data
for DTW to further improve the computational efficiency. Because our selected gestures
are symmetric, no change in the gesture recognition is observed between using the full data
and the half data.
2.4.4 Dynamic Time Wrapping Algorithm
Here, the DTW algorithm is explained briefly. Assume that the two sequence, p and
q, are of length n and m respectively, where p=p1, ..., pn and q= q1, ...qm. To compute the
similarity cost of the two sequence, DTW (p, q), we first construct an n×m matrix, where
the (i,j)-th element of the matrix indicates the distance d(pi, qj) between two points pi and
qj , where d(pi, qj) = (pi−qj)2. The cost of similarity between the two sequence then is found
by applying the dynamic programming formulation below, which defines the cumulative cost
Di,j as the cost d(pi, qj) in the current cell plus the minimum of the cumulative cost of the
adjacent elements,
Di,j = d(pi, qj) + min(Di,j−1, Di−1,j , Di−1,j−1) (2.1)
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and consequently,
DTW (p,q) = Dn,m (2.2)
An example of how we computed the similarity cost between two gestures using DTW is
given here. In our case, the tri-axis accelerometer measures acceleration in three directions:
x, y, and z. Each point in a sequence, p, then consists of three independent values, pi =
(pi,x, pi,y, pi,z). The distance d(pi, qj) between two points pi and qj of two gesture sequences
p, q then becomes
d(pi, qj) = (pi,x − qj ,x)2 + (pi,y − qj ,y)2 + (pi,z − qj ,z)2 (2.3)
Let p as a predefined template of ‘Right&Back’ gesture in our experiment, and let q
as a result of a participant performing the same gesture. The table below presents the
optimized as well as cut in half sequences of two gestures.
p q
1st (-0.29, -0.20, 15.99) (-0.57, -0.17, 16.05)
2nd (-0.44, -0.01, 14.64) (-0.29, -0.19, 14.26)
3rd (-0.60, -0.12, 15.69) (-0.26, -0.30, 15.43)
... ... ...
34th (0.67, -0.16, 15.03) ...
35th (0.53, -0.18, 14.97) ...
... ...
43th (-0.13, -0.51, 15.11)
44th (-0.09, -0.48, 15.01)
In this case, n=35 and m=44, and we start by constructing a matrix that is 35×44 and
placing p and q on each side of the matrix, as shown in Table 2.4. The (i, j)-th element of
the matrix is the distance of the two points, calculated by formulation 2.3.
Once the first matrix is filled, a second matrix is constructed. The (i, j)-th element of
the second matrix represents the cumulative cost of the current cell and it is computed by
applying the formulation 2.1, as shown in Table 2.5. The similarity cost between the two
sequences p and q, DTW(p, q), is equal to the cost in the top right corner of the matrix
that is 10.489 in this example.
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Table 2.4: Constructing the distance matrix from two sequences
p points
35th 2.362 1.179 0.842 ... 0.563 0.473
34th 2.578 1.513 1.045 ... 0.774 0.683
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
3rd 0.130 2.138 0.215 ... 0.710 0.851
2nd 2.035 0.202 0.745 ... 0.590 0.495
1st 0.086 2.986 0.330 ... 0.895 1.080
1st 2nd 3rd ... 43th 44th
q points
Table 2.5: Estimating the similarity cost of two sequences
78.867 46.341 33.151 ... 10.016 10.489
76.505 45.163 32.309 ... 11.557 12.240
... ... ... ... ... ...
2.251 2.426 0.503 ... 32.675 33.407
2.121 0.288 1.032 ... 32.556 33.050
0.086 3.073 3.403 ... 59.983 61.062
2.4.5 User Interface
In our prototype, the iPhone handset performs the gesture recognition, and so it was
implemented using Objective C language. To store the acceleration data of the templates,
we used SQLite database library [72], which is free as well as suitable for memory constrained
mobile devices. Because we have conducted two different experiments, two slightly different
systems were developed.
Figure 2.6 shows the user interface of the first experiment. The goal of the experiment
is to figure out which library size is the most efficient for the gesture-based OOB channel;
therefore, the user interface consists of 4 parts: Bit4, Depth6, Bit8 and Digit10. Each
interface is basically the same, except the number of gestures to perform. Figure 2.6 (a)
illustrates how the desktop PC informs the participants of gestures to carry out. It also
displays the original number and an execution order of four interfaces. For each generated
number, the participants can perform the gesture input of all four interfaces. Therefore,
the execution order of the interfaces is also randomly created for each time to avoid the
interface bias.
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Figure 2.6: User interface of experiment one: (a)the requester side - desktop PC (b)the
verifier side - iPhone handset
Figure 2.6 (b) illustrates the interface of the iPhone handset. It has a button, so that
the participants can press it before starting and after ending the gesture to distinguish it
from other unwanted movements. An alternative is that the users simply shake, tilt, or
tap their mobile device instead of pressing the button. Once the gestures are performed, it
displays the names of each recognized gestures, the converted number, and the total time
it has spent.
Figure 2.7 presents the user interface of the second experiment. The aim of the exper-
iment is to determine if user-defined templates improve the accuracy of the gesture-based
OOB channel. The user interface consists of two parts: evaluation and user list. The ‘Eval-
uation’ part is the main interface for executing the task, and so it is designed in such a way
that the participants can select the user-defined templates from the list (Figure 2.7 (a)).
The ‘User List’ part allows the participants to input their own gesture templates into the
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Figure 2.7: User interface of experiment two: (a) evaluation (b) user list
system. To do that, the participants carry out each gesture template the very same way as
they do the gesture input, and this time, the image of the gesture is displayed on the screen
of the handset (Figure 2.7 (b)).
2.5 Experiment One: Usability Analysis
2.5.1 Purpose
In this experiment, we investigated the usability of the gesture-based OOB channel,
specifically the completion time, error rate, and learnability. At the same time, we also
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want to determine the most appropriate sise of library for gesture-based OOB channel.
Two hypotheses were formulated. First, there is no difference between the interfaces in
terms of completion time and error rates. Second, there is no difference between the rounds
in terms of the completion time and error rates.
2.5.2 Participants and Task
Ten volunteers (three females and seven males) participated in our experiment; all of
them were either undergraduate or graduate students, and all were right-handed. Their
mean age was 24.2 years (SD of 1.9 years, range 22-29)
Before beginning the experiment, a brief introduction was given on how to carry on a
gesture input with the phone and what kind of gestures were to be used. We suggested the
participants hold the phone in the same way as shown in Figure 2.8, so that their thumb
can easily press the button on its screen as well as they can easily perform gestures in the
two-dimensional (vertical and horizontal) space.
Figure 2.8: Phone holding in the experiment
The participants were allowed to practice one time. Every participant performed the
gesture inputs 12 times with three rounds for each interface. In each round, the order of the
interfaces was randomly generated and queued to reduce bias for certain interfaces. The
experiment lasted for approximately 20 minutes. The total input time was measured from
the beginning of the first gesture to the completion of the final gesture.
With the 10 participants, a total of 120 gesture inputs were entered during the experi-
ment (four interfaces and three rounds). To analyze the collected data, repeated measures
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analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. If the results were statistically significant, we
further analyzed the data using a paired t-test between every two interfaces to locate the
differences.
2.5.3 Completion Time
Table 2.6 summarizes the completion time of the our gesture-based OOB channel trans-
fer for each designed interfaces. Repeated measures ANOVA with interface type as the
factor was significant with F (3, 29) = 45.95 and p = 0.0000. The correlation between the
completion time and the size of the gesture library was a negative high, r = -0.812.
Table 2.6: Completion time of transmission (sec)
Interface Mean SD Min Max
Bit4 22.90 5.69 11.80 36.20
Depth6 25.02 7.11 11.60 38.80
Bit8 16.86 4.23 8.30 25.30
Digit10 16.76 4.79 8.10 28.20
Therefore, we conducted paired t-tests between each pair of interfaces, as presented in
Table 2.7. The results suggested that the transmission speed between interfaces differed
significantly (t < 2, p < 0.05) for most pairs, except Bit8 and Digit10 combinations (t =
0.012, p = 0.904).
Table 2.7: Paired tTest Results of the completion time
Bit4 Depth6 Bit8 Digit10
Bit4 —–
t= -2.28
p=0.029
t=8.47
p=0.000
t=7.55
p=0.000
Depth6
t= -2.28
p=0.029
—–
t=7.79
p=0.000
t=9.29
p=0.000
Bit8
t=8.47
p=0.000
t=7.79
p=0.000
—–
t=0.012
p=0.905
Digit10
t=7.55
p=0.000
t=9.29
p=0.000
t=0.012
p=0.905
—–
Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of the mean times for performing the gestures, gaps
between the gestures, and the gesture recognition time of each interface. The Bit4 and
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Depth6 interfaces required more time for user input but less time for gesture recognition
compared to the Bit8 and Digit10 interfaces.
Figure 2.9: Time distributions for a gesture input
As a result of this evaluation, we concluded that the completion time decreases as the
size of gesture library increase. In other words, the more gestures the system has, the
less time it spends on transmission. However, both 8 and 10 gesture libraries can be the
candidate for the size of gesture-based OOB channel because they required almost same
amount of time.
2.5.4 Error rate
The error rate of the four interfaces is summarized in Figure 2.10. The Digit10 interface
exhibited the greatest error rate, with a mean error per input of 0.33 and SD = 0.48, with
0.06 errors per gesture, whereas Bit4 had the fewest, with a mean error per gesture of 0.06
and SD = 0.25, with 0.008 errors per gesture. The mean error rates of Depth6 and Bit8
were similar, at 0.1 and 0.13 errors per input and 0.014 and 0.019 per gesture, respectively.
Repeated measures ANOVA tests with interface as a factor were significant with F (3,
29) = 4.43 and p = 0.006. We conducted paired t-tests between the error rates of the
different interfaces. There was no significant difference between Bit4, Depth8, and Bit8
(p > 0.5). However, Digit10 differed significantly from the other interfaces, with t < 2 and
p < 0.05. The correlation between the error rate and the size of the gesture library was
quite high with r = 0.897.
As a result of this evaluation, we concluded that the probability of successful transmis-
sion increases as the size of gesture library decreases. In other words, the more gestures the
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Figure 2.10: Mean error rates
system has, the more error-prone it becomes. However, all of 4, 6, 8 gesture libraries can
be the candidate for the size of gesture-based OOB channel because they showed very close
error rates.
2.5.5 Learnability
The participants performed three rounds of tasks. Table 2.8 summarizes the speed of
gesture input for each round. Repeated measures ANOVA tests with round as the factor
showed that there was a significant difference between the rounds with F(2, 38) = 8.48 and
p = 0.004. However, there were no significant differences in terms of error rates between
the rounds.
Table 2.8: Completion time of rounds(sec)
Round Mean SD Min Max
First 21.7 11.7 10.3 39.8
Second 20.9 6.7 8.1 38.4
Third 18.8 7.2 8.3 32.5
As a result of this evaluation, we concluded that a user may learn how to perform the
authentication using gesture-based OOB channel over a short period of time. However, the
success of the transmission does not depend on the user.
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2.5.6 Subjective Ratings
Each participant was asked to complete a brief questionnaire. Following the experiment,
they were not able to clearly distinguish one interface from another. Therefore, the questions
were on the overall impressions of the gesture input. The questionnaire consists of the
following three questions.
Q1: How do you rate the ease of performing the gesture input?
Q2: If this gesture input enable secure communication between your mobile devices,
how do you rate the amount of time spend on one input?
Q3: If you have to do perform the gesture input next time, could you carry out it
effectively?
Figure 2.11: Result of users’ impression on the gesture input: (a) easiness (b) satisfactory
of time (c) sureness of next successful try
In first question, participants asked to give their rating on ease of use with scale of
five intervals. Figure 2.11 (a) summarizes the result, and the seventy percentages of the
participants had a positive attitude toward ease of the gesture input. In second question,
we asked about their impression on completion time of the gesture input with scale of four
intervals. The seventy percentages of the participants were also satisfied with the time they
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spent (Figure 2.11 (b)). In third question, we asked their opinion about if they can perform
gesture input effectively next time with scale of five intervals because each participant
has performed 12 gesture inputs and had enough idea of how to do it. More than eighty
percentages of participants were quite sure of themselves to carry out gesture input (Figure
2.11 (c)).
2.6 Experiment Two: User-defined Templates
2.6.1 Purpose
In the second experiment, we investigated whether or not the error rate decreased if
users inserted their own gesture templates into the mobile device. It is quite possible that
our gesture-based OOB can be extended so that users can carry out the required gestures
with the verifier device before they start the authentication. In the previous experiment,
the Bit8 interface showed the best results, so we selected Bit8 as the base interface for the
second experiment. Only two interfaces were implemented: one used predefined templates
while the other used user-defined templates when identifying the gestures.
2.6.2 Result
A different set of 10 volunteers participated in the second experiment (two males and
eight females, all of whom were right-handed). Prior to commencing the experiment, each
participant inserted the first eight gestures shown in Table 1 into the phone by perform-
ing them to create their own templates. Once all eight templates were completed, the
participant carried out the gesture input six times (three rounds for each interface).
We assessed whether there would be a difference between using the predefined templates
and the user-defined templates in terms of the error rate. From the 10 participants, we
collected a total of 60 gesture inputs (three rounds and two interfaces). Because we only
had two groups of data to compare, we used a paired t-test instead of repeated measures
ANOVA. However, no significant difference was found between the two interfaces (t (29) =
1.79, p = 0.083).
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2.7 Discussion
As shown in the table below, it appears that the Bit8 interface is the best choice for our
gesture-based OOB channel, considering the relatively high negative correlation between
the completion time and the size of the gesture library, and positive correlation between
the error rate and the size of the gesture library, as well as the similar completion times of
Bit8 and Digit10 interfaces, and error rates of Bit4, Depth6, and Bit8 interfaces.
Bit4 Depth6 Bit8 Digit10
Completion Time × × © ©
Error Rate © © © ×
The transmission speed of Bit8 interface is 16,86 seconds that is faster than some of
the popular OOB channels, such as Barcode (37 s), Alphanumeric (40 s), BEDA (45 s),
Beep&Blink combinations (30 s), and Loud&Clear (20 s). Furthermore, the Bit8 inter-
face has a mean error rate of 13%, which is lower than that of Beep&Blink combinations
(about 2030%), Barcode (53%), Alphanumeric Copy&Enter (23%), many versions of Com-
pare&Confirm (1636%), Alphanumeric Compare&Select (30%), and Numeric Copy&Enter
(13%) [36, 44].
Library size of 8 gestures is the most effective among our tested sizes. This result
may be true in general because as the library size of gesture-based OOB channel increases,
completion time decreases and error rate increases. However, the effectiveness of our chan-
nel, especially error rate, could be different in some situations since it depends profoundly
on gesture related issues, such as gesture recognition techniques, gesture selection, gesture
type and etc. Good news is that our gesture-based OOB channel can be improved by using
advances in gesture related research.
In our experiments, there was no difference between Digit10 and Bit8, and only a small
difference between Bit4 and Depth6 in terms of completion times. In other words, the
number of gestures per input had greater influence on the completion time than did the size
of the gesture library, because gesture recognition took less time than the users actions.
The error increased dramatically when using Depth10 (as shown in Fig. 5). The size of
the gesture library may be one factor (r = 0.897). Our log file revealed that approximately
80% of the Depth10 errors were related to triangle gestures. It follows that the selection of
proper gestures is very important.
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As shown in Table 2.8, the mean completion time decreased over trials in a short pe-
riod of time while the accuracy remained the same. Moreover, participants became more
confident in the execution of these tasks over the course of the experiment.
One unexpected finding is that the user-defined templates did not improve the accuracy
of the channel. However, these results should be interpreted with caution as the sample size
was relatively small. A similar study [73], for instance, has found that users interact more
accurately with a media player when adjusting predefined gestures. However, our partici-
pants asked to adjust templates of the same gestures with their own whereas UbiGesture
system [73] considered the case that the users change system gestures with the completely
different gestures.
Almost two-thirds of the participants had a positive attitude with respect to the ease
of the method, and 70% were satisfied with the time required.
During the experiments, we made a number of important observations that may help
to improve our gesture-based OOB channel. First, the speed of the users varied, which
noticeably affected the success of gesture input. Therefore, the gesture-based OOB channel
should be able to adapt to user speed by providing feedback. Secondly, the sequence of
gestures was carried out in a discrete manner; however, participants preferred continuous
gestures. In other words, pressing a button before and after every gesture placed an addi-
tional burden on the user. Finally, the participants indicated that they did not like holding
the phone in a fixed position.
2.8 Summary
This chapter introduced our proposed OOB channel that uses an accelerometer-based
gesture input. Gesture-based OOB channel is suitable for all-kinds of mobile devices, in-
cluding input/output constrained devices, as the accelerometer is small and incurs only a
small computational overhead. In our OOB channel, one device converts the authentication
data into a sequence of gestures and informs a user of them. The user then performs the
gestures one-by-one with the second device that has an embedded tri-axis accelerometer to
transfer the data into it.
We have implemented a prototype system and conducted thorough usability analysis to
compare our gesture-based OOB channel with the existing OOB channels. Result showed
that the gesture-base OOB channel has reliable performance with a mean completion time
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of 16.86 seconds with SD=4.2 seconds, as well as a mean error rate of 0.13 per transfer with
SD = 0.34. Four different gesture sets were used in this experiment to determine which
library size would be more usable in practice. The result suggested that library size of 8
gestures was the most effective among our tested sizes. We have also conducted another
experiment to determine whether user-defined gesture templates improve the accuracy of
gesture recognition. Contrary to expectations, this study did not find a significant difference
between the predefined and user-defined templates in terms of the error rate.
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Chapter 3
Accumulative Secure Group
Association
3.1 Motivation
To support our research vision, “the more OOB channels exist, the more security is
available”, we have designed a new Secure Group Association (SGA) method, in which
mobile devices could employ their desired OOB channels. In contrast, the existing group
security protocols require all group members to use the same or similar OOB channels. We
imply that our proposed method that encourages various OOB channels has more chance of
successful association than the existing SGA protocols that are too strict for spontaneous
cases. Furthermore, unlike the existing SGA protocols, the proposed method associates
devices in an accumulative manner, which means that it does not require all group members
to be present in one place at one time.
There are a couple of important reasons why we have considered the secure group
association, especially the accumulative method.
First, little attention has been paid to the association among a group of mobile devices,
even though there is a considerable body of literature in the field of secure pairing of two
mobile devices. However, there are numerous occasions in the modern wireless world in
where a group of mobile devices need to interact spontaneously as well as securely with one
another, without any prior preparation. Members in a meeting, for example, establish a
group network to exchange sensitive resources. In addition, more and more collaborative
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tasks are shifting or are likely to shift toward mobile devices. For instance, consider a
scenario that two groups of friends decide to play a game and will compete against each
other. Members of each team want to set up secure group, so that they can privately discuss
strategy without the other group overhearing them.
Second, few group security protocols have been proposed; however, these have tended
to focus on a scenario whereby all devices must be located in one place to establish the
secure connections. These simultaneous associations have several drawbacks, such as a lack
of scalability, limited group size, poor device diversity and etc. Whereas, our accumulative
secure group association method is designed for a broader range of scenario and addressed
all these limitations.
3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 Secure Group Association Protocols
To date, there have been relatively few studies in the field of secure group association;
however, a number of group security protocols including Multi-Party [74], SAS-GMA [75],
HCBK [76], and SPATE [77] have been proposed. In simple terms, each device sends its
public key to every other device via wireless networks, and then each device generates the
authentication data independently. Authentication is successful if all of the generated data
are the same. However, this approach has some significant limitations. First, all mobile
devices must have the proper output for data to be compared. Second, verifying the data
from all devices is tedious, and becomes even more so as the number of devices increases.
Chen et al. [78] introduced a slightly different SGA protocol, called GAnGS. Because
previous methods are difficult to implement with large groups, they divides groups into
subgroups for verification. However, the protocol uses a barcode-based OOB channel, which
requires all devices to have both a camera and a display. Moreover, subgrouping increases
the burden on users.
When talking about the user-aided group authentication, two important aspects must
be considered: what kind of OOB channel the method utilizes and how much the user
involvement the protocol requires. These two aspects of the existing SGA protocols are
presented in Table 3.1. If a single member broadcasts its authentication data and the
remaining members compare it with their own, the number of OOB channel transfers can
Chapter 3. Accumulative Secure Group Association 38
be (n-1), where n is the size of the group, for SAS-GMA and Multi-Party. Furthermore, in
order to detect intruders, group security protocols basically require the users to verify the
size of the group by counting the potential group members, and then either by inputting it
to the system before the association or by comparing it with the number of group members
after the association. The size verification is not included in SAS-GMA and HCBK, and that
make these protocols more impotent than others. Moreover, GAnGS uses a barcode-based
OOB channel to collect group members’ information in one place.
Table 3.1: Summary of the existing SGA protocols
Protocols Channel Type
User Involvement
OOB Transfer Other
Multy-Party Screen ≥ (n− 1) Size verification
SAS-GMA Not specified ≥ (n− 1) -
SPATE Screen n-1 Size verification
HCBK Screen n-1 -
GAnGS Screen & Camera n-1
Size verification
Data collection
Recently, few attempts [79, 80] have been made to apply a group protocol SAS-GMA [75]
to the current OOB channels and to investigate the practical usability of group association
methods. However, these studies used three and four OOB channels respectively, which
require rich user interfaces, as most OOB channels are not suitable for the protocol. In
addition, one of the significant findings from these studies is that many failures are caused
by miscommunication between users, even in a small group (of fewer than six).
Several group security protocols for body area network (BAN) in where a group consists
of many low-capability sensor devices and one controller device that has richer user interfaces
and higher computational power, and work together toward monitoring patients health in
healthcare systems, has been proposed [81–83]. BAN may be considered as a specific type of
mobile network that needs high level of privacy and security in its interactions. However, it
lacks ad-hoc nature of mobile groups in general, and so it was reflected in designed methods.
Keoh et al. [82] have proposed a system ,for example, that requires a centralized trusted
third party and assumes that every device and employees are certified by the hospital before
deployment.
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3.2.2 Group Association
A number of attempts have been made to associate multiple mobile devices, which
considers about selecting the potential group members from the environment. Lucero et al.
[84] have developed a method whereby during group association, each device must touch
the device to the right of it. This method is easy, fast, and also can prevent an adversary
from joining. Chong et al. [85] have proposed another simple and rapid group association
technique, GroupTap. It utilizes NFC tag as an OOB channel, and the users tap their
mobile devices on a selected object to get associated. However, an issue of how to protect
the communications once the group has been associated was not addressed in these methods.
Controllability indicates a social factor; an association could be controlled by either a
single user or multiple users. Uzun et al. [86] were apparently the first to introduce the
concept and to use the term social pairing that involves two different users establishing
pairing between their respective devices. They have conducted usability analysis on the
existing pairing techniques that enable social-pairing. Their study suggested that people are
reluctant to share their personal devices with others, especially strangers, as it raises privacy
concerns. In the context of group association, the issue related to controllability becomes
more crucial, because the group interactions are inherently a social activity. However, no
research has been found that considered the controllability in group cases.
Other social factors of group association have been examined in recent studies. Finding
in Kuo et al.’s study [87] demonstrated that group association protocol designs are situation
dependent, and no single solution is appropriate for all situations. In addition, Chong et
al. [88] revealed that people’s choice of group association techniques are largely influenced
by devices’ different attributes, such as their mobility and flexibility, as well as their prior
knowledge of interaction with technology.
Moreover, other techniques that form a secure group in ad-hoc and ubiquitous environ-
ment exist. For example, the concept that every node on a network issues certificates to
other nodes without a trusted third party is not a new idea. It is termed a user-centric
trust model, and some wired network systems that also have an ad-hoc nature, such as
peer-to-peer or multi-agent systems, use this model. Therefore, it can easily be adapted
to wireless networks, and the authentication essentially relies on the trust calculation [89].
However, quantifying authentication is a controversial topic in itself [90].
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3.3 Secure Group Association Types
In general, SGA can be classified into all-at-once and one-by-one association. Table 3.2
compares some important characteristics of the two categories.
Table 3.2: Characteristics of all-at once and one-by-one associations
Characteristics All-at-once One-by-one
Literature reports A few None
Proximity Required Not required
Synchronicity Required Not required
Device Diversity Limited Partly limited
Scalability Weak Strong
Group Size Limited Unlimited
User Involvement Full Semi-automatic
Robustness Weak Strong
The characteristics of SGA types are expanded on as follows:
• Literature reports: There has been little discussion of SGA, and all published
studies have described all-at-once group association [74–78]. The comparison in
Table 3.2 is between these association protocols and our proposed method.
• Proximity and Synchronicity : All group members have to be physically located
in the same place and must participate actively and simultaneously in all-at-
once group association. In contrast, as its name implies, one-by-one association
occurs in an accumulative manner, allowing each device to join the group inde-
pendently of the other group members and their associations.
• Device Diversity : In the existing protocols, all group members are expected to
possess the same physical method for verifying authentication data as shown in
Table 3.1. In SAS-GMA protocol [75], even though a specific output was not
mentioned, the protocol needed all devices to be equipped with similar interfaces
so that users could compare authentication data. However, the verification
phase of each device in our accumulative method involves only two devices: the
new device and an existing group member. Therefore, only one device from the
group is required to be compatible with the new device.
• Scalability : Scalability is a major disadvantage of all-at-one association. To add
a new device to the group, all group members that are already associated must
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be assembled and perform the association together. Group association should
allow for the addition of a new device without all of the existing devices being
physically present, and our method addresses this problem. In our method,
only the new device pairs with one existing group member, and the remaining
process is automatic.
• Group Size: As a group grows in number, all-at-once association becomes diffi-
cult to carry out and user effort increases considerably. Recent usability studies
have shown that many failures can be caused by miscommunication of users,
even in small groups of fewer than six users [79, 80]. In contrast, the size of a
group in one-by-one association can grow as big as possible without most of the
group members even being aware of the growth.
• User Involvement : Even though it is impossible to eliminate user involvement
completely, group association should be as automatic as possible. In addition
to transferring the authentication data through OOB channel, all-at-once group
association also involves the users to correctly verify the number of members
(Table 3.1). Moreover, there will be noticeable difference in terms of the user
effort over a long period of time. The total effort for the user in all-at-once asso-
ciations is increased if group reforms many times while our association remains
constant.
• Robustness: OOB channel authentication has the relatively high possibility of
encountering errors due to the user involvement [36, 44]. If an abnormal occurs
during an all-at-once association, entire process aborts even it is relevant to
one member. In other hand, authentication in our proposed method involves
two devices only and its failure does not affect other group members and their
associations.
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3.4 Proposed Accumulative Secure Group Association Method
3.4.1 Base Concept
We assume that all mobile devices are equipped with a wireless network protocol, the
installation of at least one OOB channel, and computational hardware that is sufficient for
the basic cryptographic operations.
Assume that Bob has several mobile devices as shown in Figure 3.1. To provide secure
wireless communication between his smart phone and laptop, he uses a barcode-based OOB
channel [19]. In addition, he establishes a secure connection between his smart phone and
his wireless headset using a gesture-based OOB channel [91]. He now wants to secure the
communication channel between the laptop and the wireless headset. The following question
arises: must he perform OOB pairing, which consumes a considerable amount of time and
effort [36, 44] again? We believe that our method is the most appropriate to facilitate this
kind of scenario.
Figure 3.1: Common multiple pairing scenario
Our accumulative SGA method has two principle aspects, which are described below:
• Certification:Two devices are paired using user-aided authentication. Once the
public key is verified successfully, the verifier issues a digital certificate to the
requester, as depicted in Figure 3.2. The certificate is saved in a protected
repository, called the KeyStore, on both devices. KeyStore holds two types of
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certificates: certificate entries and key entries. Certificate entries are certificates
that the device itself has issued to other devices, whereas key entries are used
to ensure the public key of the device and are signed by other devices.
• Certification Path Pairing (CPP): Saved certificates are used for subsequent
pairing. For instance, suppose Bobs smart phone has already received a certifi-
cate from the laptop and that the headset has also received a certificate from
the phone. This means that there is a certification path between the laptop
and the headset, i.e., Cert(Laptop ⇒ Phone) + Cert(Phone ⇒ Headset), as
shown in Figure 3.2. Given this, the laptop can have confidence in the public
key of the headset, and so issues a certificate to it without OOB channel-based
pairing. Finally, a certificate is also issued to the headset from the laptop,
Cert(Laptop⇒ Headset). If cross certification is required, CPP is repeated in
the reverse direction.
Figure 3.2: The base concept of the accumulative SGA method
Compared to a system in which every device in the group is paired with every other
device, the effort required is reduced from O(N2) to O(N). Saving the user time and effort
is not the only merit of CPP, however, as it also enables the pairing of two mobile devices
without a common OOB channel. For example, a wireless headset can not be paired using
the barcode-based OOB channel, which requires a camera and a display. Assume that the
laptop also is not able to communicate using the gesture-based OOB channel. Consequently,
Chapter 3. Accumulative Secure Group Association 44
Bob can use the smart phone, which can pair using both barcode-based and gesture-based
OOB channels, as a bridge between the laptop and the headset.
Although CPP allows pairing of two mobile devices, this result shows the essential
features of SGA. Once CPP is completed successfully, more than two mobile devices can
possess the authenticated public keys of other devices. In this situation, they can easily
build a secure group at any time.
3.4.2 Centralized Model
Proposed accumulative SGA method assumes that every mobile device is able to pair
using at least one OOB channel. However, even if this requirement is satisfied, establishing
a fully authenticated group may be impossible in some cases. For example, suppose Bob
has seven devices and he wants to associate all of them. All possible pairings are performed
and the certificates are issued, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Limitations in the accumulative SGA method
Consider the following cases:
• No matching OOB channel : For example, Bobs camera can pair with other
devices only using an LED-based OOB channel [24]; however, no other devices
can communicate using this channel.
• No direct found : Even if there is a certification path, for example, from the iPod
to the headset, CPP may not occur between them directly because the certi-
fication path is supposed to include two certificates only: one is the requester
received from the middle device and another is the verifier issued to the middle
device in the proposed method. Therefore, in order to execute CPP between
iPod and the headset that has the certification path of three certificates, CPP
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is carried out first either between the headset and the laptop or between the
iPod and the phone.
• No path at all : CPP may never be executed between some pairs of devices
due to the lack of the certification path between them. If two mobile devices
share the same OOB channel, they are able to be paired using the user-aided
authentication. In Bobs case, the printer is paired with the iPad only and the
laptop is paired with the phone and iPod. However, there is no certification
path found between the printer and the laptop.
The centralized model of the method can address these limitations. To build the cen-
tralized model, one of the mobile devices must be designated as a groupHub. This should be
the device with the greatest computing power and the most user interfaces. In Bob’s case,
his laptop can be the groupHub. All OOB channels that are to be used must be installed
in the groupHub, whereas only one OOB channel is required for the other mobile devices.
In centralized model, the accumulative secure group association proceeds as follows.
First, each device is paired with the groupHub using the desired OOB channel, and cer-
tificates are issued. Following this, every pair of devices can automatically be paired using
CPP, as shown in Figure 3.4. A device can join the group at any time by following these
steps.
Figure 3.4: Centralized model of the accumulative SGA method
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3.4.3 Certification Path Pairing (CPP) Protocol
In the proposed method, a secure group is established in an accumulative manner. To
join the group, a new member pairs with the groupHub, first, using their desired OOB
channel. After the pairing is successfully completed and certificates are exchanged, the new
member is supposed to pair with other group members at any time using the certification
path. Therefore, we have proposed Certification Path Pairing (CPP) protocol. CPP pro-
tocol is designed in such a way that the new member can mutually associate one or more
existing group members simultaneously, as depicted in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: CPP protocol in general
In CPP protocol, three rounds are performed between the new device and every group
member to certify mutually. The new device initiates the protocol by broadcasting a request
(Request ND). Once the group member receives the request, it establishes a regular unicast
connection with the new device, and sends the result of the request (Result ND) along with
its own request (Request GM). In the end, the new device sends the result of the received
request (Result GM) back to the group member.
Figure 3.6 depicts the sequence of the first half (Request ND and Result ND) of the
CPP protocol as another half (Request GM and Result GM) is the exactly same. ndCont
and ndStore represent objects on the new device, and gmCont and gmStore are on the
group member side.
The rounds of the protocol are expanded on as follows.
ROUND 1. The new group member broadcast a request, which includes the certificate
sender request (aCSR) and the certificates that were issued by the groupHubs
(hubCert []). Mobile devices may join many different groups, thus there may
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Figure 3.6: CPP protocol sequence
be more than one groupHub certificates in their KeyStore. It does not matter
which groupHub certificate is used as long as there is certification path between
two devices.
ROUND 2. Round 2: After receiving the request, group member searches a certification
path to the new device (findPath). The certification path is supposed to consist
of two certificates: one is groupHubs issued certificate to the new device and
another is the group members issued certificate to the groupHub. The new
device sends groupHubs issued certificate, and therefore, to find the path, the
group member tries to find the certificate, of which the subject is the equal
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to the issuer of the received certificate, from its Keystore. If the path exists,
it needs to be validated (validatePath). To do that, expiration dates of both
certificates are checked first. Then, the digital signature of the received grou-
pHub certificate is verified by using its public key on certificate of the group
member. If the path is valid, group member then issues a certificate (aCert) to
the new device and saves it in its KeyStore as a certificate entry (saveCertEn-
try). Otherwise, it refuses to certify. Therefore, the result includes either the
refusal or the newly issued certificate. The new device also saves the received
certificate in its own KeyStore as a key entry (saveKeyEntry).
3.4.4 Role of the groupHub
If the groupHub certificates all of the group members, why do we need the mutual
certification between each pair of group members? In the proposed method, the groupHub
is not a trusted third party and does not take on the same level of responsibility of a
certificate authority. Instead, it serves only as a bridge between other devices to enable
authentication. Moreover, relying on one mobile device completely ubiquitous environment
should be avoided. In other words, group association should be as flexible as possible and
has the ability to move on in any cases. Therefore, if there is no sign of the groupHub when
adding a new device, a different device in the group can be designated as the groupHub.
In that case, the new device is able to join the group as following the same steps as usual
because the new groupHub has already exchanged certificates with other group members.
That means that the group can have more than one groupHub.
Moreover, a mobile device can join more than one group, and remain for a long period
of time, due to the ad-hoc nature of mobile networks. For example, Bob can create a secure
group for his personal devices at home. Furthermore, his laptop may also be a member of
another group in his office. This means the device can possess several groupHub certificates.
Selecting a specific group is not possible in CPP protocol. However, the proximity of mobile
devices may assist to distinguish the groups. For example, when Bob starts CPP protocol
with his laptop in the office, Alices device is most likely to find a certification path with the
groupHub of the office.
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3.5 Prototype System
3.5.1 System Setup
For a comparative experiment, we implemented two prototype systems: our proposed
accumulative SGA method and an all-at-once association. The purpose of the experiment
is to compare the mean completion time of two associations.
We chose SAS-GMA [75] protocol as a representative of the all-at-once association to
compare with our accumulative SGA method for a couple of reasons. First, as presented in
Table 3.1, it is one of the protocols that require the minimum user involvement. To associate
n mobile devices, SAS-GMA protocol only needs (n-1) OOB channel transfers. Without
verifying the size of the group, all-at-once association protocols could not prevent intruders
from joining. Thus, it is a serious drawback of SAS-GMA protocol. If size verification is
added to the protocol, its completion time will notably increase.
Second, unlike other group association protocols, SAS-GMA does not specify a type
of OOB channel that it needs. However, it has to be the same or similar for all group
members, so that SAS authentication data can be verified simultaneously. We decided
to use a barcode-based OOB channel for SAS-GMA implementation to avoid the human
related errors, because the completion time of the successful associations is needed for our
experiment. In d2d type of OOB channels, including the barcode-based, the users have
relatively little influence on the success of the transmission. Those channels transfer the
authentication data directly from the requester to the verifier, and the users only assist
in making the transmission possible. Furthermore, smart phones that have both a screen
and a camera are used in our experiment, and therefore, a barcode-based transfer was the
handiest in our situation. To equalize with SAS-GMA, the accumulative SGA method also
utilizes the barcode-based OOB channel for its pairings.
Both prototype systems were developed on smart phones running the Android operating
system. The implementation used Java language and cryptography part was written using
Bouncy Castle library [92], which contains a lightweight cryptography API suitable for
memory-constrained devices. The Barcode-based OOB channel was implemented using
ZXing open-source library [93]. The communication between devices used WLAN. Table
3.3 shows the technical specification of the smart phone handsets that we used in the
experiment.
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Table 3.3: Technical specification of handsets
Device CPU RAM Android Version
Samsung Galaxy Note Cortex-A9 dual-core 1.4 GHz 1GB 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich
Samsung Nexus S Cortex-A8 dual-core 1.5GHz 1GB 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich
Samsung Galaxy 2S
Qualcomm Scorpion dual-core
1.5GHz
1GB 2.3 Gingerbread
Pantech Mirach
Qualcomm Snapdragon dual-
core 1GHz
512MB 2.3 Gingerbread
Sharp IS01 Qualcomm QSD8650 1GHz 256MB 1.6 Donut
Table 3.4: Computational overhead of cryptographic operations (msec)
Operation
Galaxy Note Nexus S Galaxy 2S Mirach IS01
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
RSA Key
Generation
620.2 285.18 799.3 472.83 625.78 328.03 910.2 614.82 804.4 410.24
CSR Gener-
ation
57.92 18.06 35.4 13.96 30.16 36.86 36.84 6.63 48.3 35.75
Certificate
Verification
69.18 15.1 34.28 5.67 25.5 1.31 30.84 1.26 50.66 34.91
Certificate
Generation
37.56 6.82 94.4 36.49 93 43.19 104.5 35.89 297.28 209.21
Table 3.4 presents the computational overhead of the handsets for several cryptographic
operations. Each Data is summarized from 10 trials. RSA operations are performed using
1024-bit keys taking into account low-power mobile devices. As can be seen from the table,
the key generation consumes the most time; however, the key pair is only created when the
system runs for the first time.
3.5.2 Proposed Method Implementation
Our proposed accumulative SGA method consists of two parts. To join a group, a new
device pairs with the groupHub first, and then it associates other group members using
CPP protocol, explained in Section 3.4.3. For the first part, the prototype system adopted
modified SAS protocol [23], as it can authenticate the public keys of both devices with one
OOB channel transfer. As a result, the number of barcode-based OOB channel transfer
becomes n-1, where n is the size of the group. The sequence of the modified SAS protocol
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in our implementation is depicted in Figure 3.7. The new device initiates the protocol by
broadcasting a request.
The protocol consists of six rounds, including the OOB channel transfer. Even though
not shown on the figure, every transmission between devices has a unique identifier to
protect from replay attack. The rounds of the protocol are expanded on as follows.
Figure 3.7: Sequence of the modified SAS protocol in the prototype
ROUND 1. Primary purpose of the SAS protocol [14] is to reduce the length of the authen-
tication data, so that the low-bandwidth OOB channels can be used. However,
our selected barcode-based OOB channel is capable of transferring data that is
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bigger than the size of public key. Thus, the prototype uses 16 byte SAS data
instead of 16 bit (pickRand). Moreover, a symmetric cryptography function
(generateKey) is used for the implementation of the commitment scheme. The
encrypt() function replaces the ‘COMMIT’ phase and the decrypt() function
replaces the ‘OPEN’ phase of the commitment scheme. Thus, the new device
encrypts its public key (nPK) as well as the random (aRand) with the gener-
ated key (aKey) and broadcasts its public key (nPK) along with the encrypted
data (aCypher).
ROUND 2. When the groupHub receives the request, it establishes a regular unicast con-
nection with the new device, and sends its public key (hPK). Figure shows
the public keys only in round 1 and round 2, for the sake of the simplicity.
However, in the actual prototype system, a certificate sender request (CSR),
which includes not only the public key but also all necessary information about
the device for the certification, is sent.
ROUND 3. Once the new device receives the public key of the groupHub, it sends back
the symmetric key (aKey). The groupHub then decrypts the received data in
round 1 with the key to get the committed value of the new device. Finally,
both devices compute the SAS authenticatin data (aSAS) independently by
performing exclusive OR operation between the commited value (aRand) and
the hash of the public key of the groupHub.
ROUND 4. BARCODE transfer takes place with the assistance of the user. The new device
converts own SAS data into the QR code, and then displays it on its screen.
The groupHub scans the code using its camera.
ROUND 5. The groupHub converts the scanned QR code into the SAS data. If the received
SAS data through the barcode transfer is the exactly same as its own computed
SAS data, the groupHub issues a certificate to the new device. Otherwise, the
groupHub sends the refusal.
ROUND 6. If the new device receives the certificate from the groupHub, it also issues a
certificate and sends it to the groupHub.
On completion of the successful pairing with the groupHub, the new device launches the
CPP protocol by broadcasting a request in order to associate with other group members.
CPP protocol consists of the additional three rounds, as shown in Figure 3.5.
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3.5.3 SAS-GMA Protocol Implementation
SAS-GMA protocol is very similar to the SAS pairing protocol. Main difference is that
there is no unicast connection between devices. Instead, all group members simultaneously
communicate through broadcasting as shown in Figure 3.8 It has five rounds including a
barcode-based OOB channel transfer. Even though not shown on the figure, every trans-
mission between devices has a unique identifier to protect from replay attack. Rounds of
the protocol are expanded on as follows.
Figure 3.8: Sequence of the SAS-GMA protocol in the prototype
ROUND 1. Every device broadcasts a request that includes their public key and encrypted
data simultaneously. The procedure of committing the random value is the
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same as the one, described in round 1 of the accumulative SGA method imple-
mentation.
ROUND 2. Every device receives the requests of other group members. Round 1 and
round 2 occur synchronously. SAS-GMA protocol is designed for devices to
wait for a while before moving to the next round. An initial version of the
prototype was implemented as it is. Because our experiment considers small
groups with size of 4 to 6 members, the prototype was made to wait for 3
seconds. Time is measured from the device sending its request. However,
the main goal of the experiment is to compare the mean completion time of
two types of associations. If one system stops for seconds of time during the
association, another system will get the benefit from it. Therefore, we decided
to change the protocol slightly, and in our final version of the prototype, the
participants input the expected group size into the system. As a result, instead
of waiting, the system proceeds to the next round when it receives the same
number of the requests as the group size.
ROUND 3. Every device broadcasts their encryption key to open their commitments.
ROUND 4. Every device receives the encryption keys of the other group members. Round
3 and round 4 occur synchronously. Once the device receives the keys from
all devices that have sent the request, it decrypts all received data in round
1. Every device then independently computes the SAS authentication data.
To do that, all committed values must be put into an order by their senders
identities. Our prototype sorts them based on IP address of the device. Then,
we concatenate the sorted values because the barcode-based OOB channel is
not low-bandwidth, and so the length of the SAS data is not a problem in the
prototype. Finally, the SAS data is ready by hashing the concatenated value
(hash(1Rand + . . . + nRand)).
ROUND 5. BARCODE transfer takes place with the assistance of the users. Instead of
transferring the SAS data between every pair of devices, the prototype chooses
one device (SASSender) to display the SAS data as the form of a QR code
(displaySAS) and other members scan it by their camera (scanSAS). It reduces
the number of OOB channel transfer from n ∗ (n− 1)/2 to n-1, where n is the
size of the group. After scanning the code, the device checks the received SAS
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data against its own created one, and then informs the result (showResult).
The association accomplishes, if all devices verify the SAS data.
3.5.4 User Interface
Figure 3.9 presents the user interface of the prototype system of the proposed method.
Interface (a) is the main interface of the experiment. To add their device to a group, the
participants press the ‘Join Group’ button. ‘Reset’ button is to prepare the device for the
next experiment. It also informs the participant in real-time of how many certificates are
in the keystore. Interface (b) shows the basic information about the device. The prototype
system gives a unique ID, which starts with ‘SMG’, to each device to avoid relying on the
specific hardware, and it represents the device during the association. The groupHub can
be designated on this settings as well. Interface (c) reads the keystore and shows both type
of certificates.
Figure 3.9: User interface of the proposed method: (a) experiment (b) settings (c) Keystore
reading
Figure 3.10 presents the user interface of the prototype system of SAS-GMA proto-
col.Interface (a) is the main interface of the experiment. To associate devices, the partici-
pants presses ‘Start’ button on their respective devices simultaneously. Once the association
completed, it displays the result of the SAS data verification. During the association, it
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Figure 3.10: User interface of the SAS-GMA protocol: (a) experiment (b) settings (c)
barcode transfer
informs the participant in real-time of how many devices it is interacting with. Interface (b)
is similar to that of the previous prototype and the SASSender is designated here. More-
over, the group size is chosen prior to each association on this settings. Interface (c) shows
how the SASSender displays the converted QR code along with the original SAS data.
3.6 Comparative User Experiment
3.6.1 Purpose
In this experiment, we have investigated a comparative study of the one-by-one and all-
at-once group association methods in terms of the completion time. One-by-one association
has a number of advantages over all-at-once associations, as reported in Section 3.3. It
has stronger scalability, greater flexibility, unlimited size, better device diversity, and etc.
However, one-by-one association is intuitively considered that it needs much more time to
complete. Therefore, the purpose of this experiment is to clarify this particular assumption.
The hypothesis of the study is that one-by-one association is not slower than all-at-once
association.
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3.6.2 Tasks
Figure 3.11: Task sequence of the proposed method: Completion time is measured from
starting the first member pairing with the groupHub to completing CPP protocol of the
last member.
Figure 3.11 depicts the task sequence of the experiment that associates mobile devices
using our accumulative SGA method. Before an association, one device is designated as
the groupHub (marked as ‘H’ in the figure); however, time for this action is not counted
in the total association time. At this point, a group has no member, and so devices have
no certificates (step 1). Participants then hold the groupHub in turn to pair it with their
respective devices using SAS protocol with the barcode-based OOB channel. If the pairing
is successful, both devices get two more certificates: a received certificate and an issued
certificate (step 2). As soon as the pairing is completed, the newly joined device starts
pairing again with other group members simultaneously using CPP protocol. Each pairing
also adds two more certificates to its corresponding devices (step 3). When the association
is completed, each group member is supposed to possess 2 ∗ (n− 1) certificates, where n is
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the number of devices (step 4). The total association time is measured from starting the
first member pairing with the groupHub to completing CPP protocol of the last member.
Figure 3.12: Task sequence of the SAS-GMA protocol: Completion time is measured from
launching association on all devices to ending the last device displaying the result of the
verification.
Similarly, Figure 3.12 depicts the task sequence of the experiment that associates mobile
devices using SAS-GMA protocol. Before an association, one device is designated as a
SASSender (marked as ‘S’ in the figure). In addition, participants input to their respective
devices how many devices would be associated by selecting the group size on the settings.
However, time for these actions is not counted in the total association time (step 1). All
participants then start the association with their respective devices at the same time. On
completion of SAS-GMA protocol, each device displays how many members they have
connected (step 2). Finally, participants hold the SASSender in turn to verify the computed
SAS data of their devices using the barcode-based OOB channel. The device informs the
result of the verification by displaying ‘OK’ or ‘Not matched.’ (step 3, step 4). The total
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association time is measured from launching association on all devices to ending the last
device displaying the result of the verification.
3.6.3 Participants
Fifteen volunteers (eight females and seven males) participated in our experiment; all
of them were either undergraduate or graduate students. Their mean age was 29.7 years
(SD=5.79 years, range 20-38). Before beginning the experiment, a brief introduction was
given on how to carry out both associations.
In line with other group association studies [77, 79, 80], we considered a common setting
with small groups (sizes 4-6). Various combinations of different handsets of which technical
specifications are presented in Table 3.3, were tested. Participants were randomly selected
into 4, 5, and 6 persons groups. Each group carried out both one-by-one and all-at-once
associations. We have conducted total of ten associations for each method in all three group
sizes. Therefore, a single participant has involved in more than one association, but no two
groups were the exactly same. Figure 3.13 (a) illustrates how a group of five participants
are performing associations in the experiment.
Figure 3.13: User experiment: (a) multiple user - 5 participants are discussing a task before
the association (b) single user - a participant is associating 4 devices
In addition to the multiple user experiment, we have conducted the same experiment
in a single user scenario. The aim of this experiment is to observe the completion time
difference between one-by-one and all-at-once associations when a single person associates
a group of mobile devices. Thus, each of fifteen participants was asked to carry out the
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both group associations in three different group sizes alone. The task sequences were the
basically same as those of multiple user cases. The only difference was that the participant
did not need to pass the groupHub or SASSender to others, and as a result, the designated
groupHub or SASSender devices became the center of their association processes. Figure
3.13 (b) illustrates how a participant is associating devices in the experiment.
3.6.4 Result
Table 3.6 summarizes the completion time of two methods, the proposed accumulative
SGA method and SAS-GMA protocol, in three group sizes. We analyzed the collected
data using paired tTest between two methods in each group size to determine if there are
statistically significant differences. The results are presented on the middle column of the
table, and they clearly demonstrate that no significant differences between the completion
times of one-by-one and all-at-once associations (p > 0.05) were found for group size of 4,
5, and 6 devices.
Table 3.5: Completion time of associations - multiple users (sec)
Size
Proposed Method Paired tTest
(df=10)
SAS-GMA
Mean SD Mean SD
4 27.05 3.01 t=0.92, p=0.383 25.29 4.55
5 34.32 2.68 t=1.38, p=0.200 32.18 3.35
6 42.11 3.22 t=-0.57, p=0.581 43.94 8.08
We also asked our participants to carry out the both group associations alone in order
to observe the differences in single user cases. However, the results were very similar to
those of the multiple user cases, as shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.6: Completion time of associations - single user (sec)
Size
Proposed Method Paired tTest
(df=14)
SAS-GMA
Mean SD Mean SD
4 26.70 4.72 t=-0.95, p=0.359 28.90 8.27
5 33.60 5.31 t=-1.09, p=0.295 35.83 6.01
6 42.87 8.27 t=0.16, p=0.872 42.39 5.11
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In the end, we analyzed the same data again to see whether there are statistically
significant differences between the completion time of multiple-user and single-user cases.
Paired tTest was also used for each association method in all three group sizes. As shown
in Table 3.7, no significant differences (p > 0.05) in all six cases were found.
Table 3.7: Comparison between multiple and single user associations
System
Paired tTest (df=9)
4 5 6
Proposed method t=0.60, p=0.562 t=-1.85, p=0.097 t=-1.50, p=0.167
SAS-GMA t=1.56, p=0.153 t=2.14, p=0.061 t=-0.59, p=0.57
As a result, it can be concluded that both one-by-one and all-at-once group associations
spend the similar amount of time in the small group of less than 6 devices for both single
and multiple user cases. Moreover, the number of users does not affect the completion time
of the group associations.
3.7 Discussion
In our user experiment, we asked the participants to associate all devices immediately
because the purpose of the study was to measure the association time. However, in general,
the proposed accumulative SGA method is supposed to associate devices without any lim-
itation on time and place. For instance, assume that 5 employers associated their personal
devices during a meeting using our method. On the next scheduled meeting, an employer
could not participate while two new comers joined. New employers could easily add their
devices to the group even though one member was missing. The device of employer who
was absent is able to associate with new group members in any place at any time using
CPP protocol that is automatic.
The completion time of the user-aided authentication relies profoundly on the user
involvement in the association process because the speed of OOB channel transfer is much
slower than wireless communications no matter how slow the network is and how many
rounds the protocol performs. Moreover, it varies depending on OOB channel type. We
used a barcode-based OOB channel in our experiment for both of all-at-once and one-
by-one associations. All-at-once association basically requires the same OOB channels for
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all members. In contrast, our method is supposed to associate devices using their desired
OOB channels. Therefore, the experiment we have conducted is not realistic to some extent.
However, it has proved that a tendency to believe that the one-by-one association spends
more time is wrong.
In general, the process of establishing a secure group consists of two parts: secure
group association, also called trust establishment, and secure group formation (SGF), or
key management. SGA and SGF should occur as independently as possible in ubiquitous
environment. Due to the ad hoc nature of mobile networks, changes in the group tend
to happen frequently, and so efficient handling is required. Our proposed method consid-
ers SGA only. To interact securely within the group, SGF method, which determines a
group key, is necessary. Once the group members are authenticated successfully using the
accumulative SGA method, some or all members can use their authenticated public keys
to establish the group key using one of the existing SGF protocols [94–96]. This process
should be fast and easy as it does not require user involvement.
To add a new member is easy in the proposed accumulative SGA method. To do
that, the new member pairs with groupHub first, and then it associates with other group
members using CPP protocol. However, how to remove the member from the group is not
a simple task and must be considered carefully. A successful execution of the proposed
method exchanges digital certificates among group members; therefore the system needs to
revoke certificates to remove the undesired member. In an ad-hoc and ubiquitous network,
distributing a certificate revocation list is not practical. The simplest solution to this
problem is to adjust certificate lifetimes. In addition, the group can exclude the undesired
member from the group key establishment protocol.
The digital certificate in the proposed accumulative SGA method binds the public key
to a unique hardware identifier of the mobile device, such as MAC address. However, for
some cases, it may need to include a user-friendly name of the device. The model number
or manufacturers name of the device cannot be used, because these do not provide a unique
identification. Names that can be changed by the user such as a Bluetooth-friendly name
can serve this purpose. However, it has been reported that 18% of users do not change the
Bluetooth-friendly name of their device from manufacturer default [97]. Moreover, some
devices may not have an interface that allows the user to change the device name. Therefore,
to address this problem, the user may input the name into the device using the groupHub
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by including it in the groupHub certificate during the pairing because the groupHub is
expected to have rich user interface.
3.8 Summary
This chapter introduced our proposed accumulative SGA method that utilizes various
types OOB channels. There has been little discussion of setting up secure connections
between groups of mobile devices. Some security protocols have been proposed, but they
have tended to focus on a scenario whereby all devices must be physically located in the
same place to perform the association. In contrast, our method is designed for a broader
range of scenario and does not require all devices to be in one place at one time. It occurs
in an accumulative manner, allowing each device to join the group independently from the
other group members and their associations. Our proposed method assumes that all mobile
devices are capable of pairing using at least one OOB channel. To join a group, a device
must perform OOB channel pairing with one of the group members. Digital certificates are
then issued upon the successful authentication. Once certificates are exchanged between
the new device and one member, pairing with other group members becomes automatic
owing to the certification path.
We have implemented a prototype system and conducted a comparative user experiment
in order to ensure viability of the proposed method. The result proved that the accumu-
lative association spent the same amount time as the simultaneous group associations. In
addition, we reported comparison on accumulative and simultaneous associations and it
clearly demonstrated our proposed method has a number of attractive features, such as
stronger scalability, greater flexibility, unlimited group size, better device diversity and etc,
over the existing secure group association protocols.
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Conclusion
The increased popularity of mobile devices, such as laptops, mobile phones, tablets,
accessory devices, and more, brings new challenges in the area of network security. In ubiq-
uitous environment, where ad-hoc networks may be formed using mobile devices, virtual
connection or pairing is required before transferring any data wirelessly. Large numbers of
researches have focused on the user-aided authentication to establish a secure connection
between mobile devices, commonly referred as secure device pairing. The user-aided au-
thentication is an authentication technique that is generally based on a human perceivable
channel, called out-of-band (OOB) channel, through which the authentication data can be
transferred.
A significant number of OOB channels have been proposed so far. The principle limi-
tation of these approaches, however, is that every one of them is devoted to one particular
situation and is not intended to be used for various mobile devices. In general, a univer-
sally applicable OOB channel is unlikely to exist in the near future due to the different
capabilities of a wide variety of mobile devices as well as human users who have diverse
preferences. Therefore, if a mobile device possesses as many as possible OOB channels, its
possibility of successful pairing in ad-hoc and ubiquitous environment will increase. Based
on this concept, we have defined our research vision, “the more OOB channels, the more
security”.
4.1 Contributions
To support the research vision, we have proposed two new methods.
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First, we have introduced a new OOB channel that uses an accelerometer-based gesture
input. Gesture-based OOB channel is suitable for all-kinds of mobile devices, including
input/output constrained devices, as the accelerometer is small and incurs only a small
computational overhead. In our OOB channel, one device converts the authentication data
into a sequence of gestures and informs a user of them. The user then performs the gestures
one-by-one with the second device that has an embedded accelerometer to transfer the data
into it. We have implemented a prototype system and conducted thorough usability analysis
to compare our gesture-based OOB channel with the existing OOB channels. Result showed
that the gesture-based OOB channel has reliable performance with a mean completion time
of 16.86 seconds with SD=4.2 seconds, as well as a mean error rate of 0.13 per transfer with
SD = 0.34. Four different gesture sets were used in this experiment to determine which
library size would be more usable in practice. The result suggested that library size of 8
gestures was the most effective among our tested sizes. We have also conducted another
experiment to determine whether user-defined gesture templates improve the accuracy of
gesture recognition. Contrary to expectations, this study did not find a significant difference
between the predefined and user-defined templates in terms of the error rate.
Second, we have designed a new secure group association method that utilizes various
types of OOB channels. The term secure group association is generally understood to mean
that every device pairs with other group members. There has been little discussion of set-
ting up secure connections among group of mobile devices. Some security protocols have
been proposed, but they have tended to focus on a scenario whereby all devices must be
physically located in the same place to perform the association. In contrast, our method is
designed for a broader range of scenario and does not require all devices to be in one place
at one time. It occurs in an accumulative manner, allowing each device to join the group
independently from the other group members and their associations. To join a group, a
device must perform secure pairing with one of the group members. Digital certificates are
then issued upon the successful authentication. Once certificates are exchanged between
the new device and the member, pairing with other group members becomes automatic
owing to the certification path. We have implemented a prototype system and conducted
a comparative user experiment in order to ensure viability of the proposed method. The
result proved that the accumulative group association spends the same amount time as the
simultaneous group association. In addition, we have reported comparison on accumulative
and simultaneous associations and it clearly demonstrates our proposed method has a num-
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ber of attractive features, such as stronger scalability, greater flexibility, unlimited group
size, better device diversity and etc, over the existing protocols.
There will be more portable devices and more collaborative work in the near future,
and the user-aided authentication will still play an important role to secure ad-hoc and
ubiquitous networks. We hope that our proposed methods contribute to build an secure
environment, where the security is always available on demand.
4.2 Future Work
In the future, we would like to implement a complete library that is based on our
accumulative secure group association method. The library will include all kinds of secure
pairing protocols, all types of OOB channels, as well as alternative wireless technologies, so
that any mobile device is able to pair or associate in the ubiquitous environment regardless
of their physical capabilities. We want to investigate other security technologies, such as
TinyECC [98], which are more suitable for the resource constraint mobile devices, and also
can substitute expensive public key cryptography operations while offering the same degree
of security and functionality. Furthermore, we need to study social factors of the users
during the group association.
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